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Lawrence M. Sung* 
 
Medical Alert: Alarming Challenges Facing Medical 
Technology Innovation 
I 
A public policy rationale for the establishment of intellectual property 
rights, particularly patent grants, is the incentive to invent and the incentive 
to invest in innovation that exclusivity supports. The operation of this 
concept may be observed at several stages along the development cycle of 
new medical technologies.1 For example, the basic research conducted at 
academic institutions may be funded in part by the transfer of this 
technology through the assignment or licensing of patent rights to the 
private sector.2 In turn, the industry may obtain further investment based on 
the patent rights to support efforts to develop and commercialize innovative 
products and processes.3 The cycle is complete as the financial rewards of 
enhanced commercial competitiveness through patent exclusivity are 
realized and available for reinvestment in other basic research.4 
This dynamic, however, is open to criticism focused on the third stage 
of the cycle described above, where the patent exclusivity may give rise to 
licensing practices and patent enforcement that hinder or block public 
access to innovations having cognizable benefits for public health, safety 
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 1. The development cycle includes (1) funding research and development, (2) investing in 
commercialization, and (3) reinvesting earnings into new research. See infra notes 2–4 and 
accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and 
Industry in the Life Sciences—An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996) 
(estimating that industry funded $1.5 billion for academic research in 1994). 
 3. See id. at 369–70, 372 fig. 3 (finding that approximately 62% of firms realized patents, 
63% realized products marketed, and 61% realized a sales revenue based in part on the firm’s 
relationship with the university).  
 4. See id. at 372 (noting that because of the commercial gains realized, “industries in the life 
sciences would appear to have no reason to reduce spending on academic research sooner or more 
sharply than they would reduce research-related spending in nonacademic sites”). 
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and welfare.5 Indeed, the appreciation of intellectual property rights is 
perhaps further from universal acceptance today than ever before. Beyond 
continuing rallies against the notions of patent exclusivity as engines of 
innovation generally,6 the skepticism ignores the underlying premise that 
patent rights inherently foster innovation by demanding public disclosure of 
inventions in exchange for a temporary term of exclusivity. Perhaps 
unprecedented is the pervasive readiness to disavow this quid pro quo 
between the public and the inventor when the disclosed invention 
culminates in a product or process that achieves market demand.7 
Particularly with medical technology, compromising patent exclusivity 
in the face of the public wants and needs for novel medical prevention, 
diagnosis and treatment seems a compelling case.8 But as with most 
 
 5. See generally OFFICE OF INDUSTRIES, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, Pub. No. 4039, 
PATENTING TRENDS AND INNOVATION IN INDUSTRIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, 2, 4–5 (2008) 
(discussing the anticommons theory relating to biotechnology patents); Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 
280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (noting that “[a] proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream 
may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product 
development”). 
 6. See Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 41 (2006) (asserting that researchers will likely “give up 
the search for fundamental discoveries and instead focus on patentable, and therefore more 
remunerative, inventions”); Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the 
Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1258, 1283 
(2009) (finding that startup executives report that patents are providing “relatively mixed to weak 
incentives to engage in innovation”); Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the 
Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 134–35 (2009) (noting a study that 
suggests that the current patent system “may generate significantly lower rates of innovation”) 
(emphasis added)). 
 7. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
65, 107 (2009) (footnotes omitted) (“Patent theory presumes that a socially-beneficial product or 
technology accompanies each issued patent. This is the exchange society obtains — a new and 
non-obvious technology in return for the grant of a limited period of exclusivity.”); Brett M. 
Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 292–93 (2007) (“Patent 
owners should not always be entitled to capture the full social benefit of their invention. Rather, 
particularly in circumstances where the defendant or third parties made significant contributions to 
the success of the product, social welfare requires that they be entitled to continue to make use of 
that product. Patent owners should be compensated for the use, to be sure, but in those cases 
compensation—and not a property right of complete control—is all they should receive.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner “Process” Infringer: 
Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 70 
(1999) (finding that most General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) countries exclude 
medical procedures from patentability for public policy reasons); Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims 
Losers of a Drug War; U.S. Policy Keeps Prices Prohibitive, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1999, at A01 
(explaining that anti-AIDS medical advances from the West were not reaching Africa because its 
countries and their citizens had to choose between buying drugs at their fair market price, which is 
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operations of law, the specific events that present the easiest justifications 
to succumb to current social pressures at the expense of principles create the 
true test of established legal doctrines. 
This article addresses the recent federal court jurisprudence that has 
cast doubt on the continuing vitality of patent rights to medical technology, 
including genomic information-based innovations. In particular, the cases 
which have reopened the debate on the limitations of patentable subject 
matter will be discussed.9 This article concludes with a few insights and 
proffers regarding our sense of invention and discovery as applied to 
medical technology.10 
II 
As biotechnology has come to the forefront, the number of technological 
advances that have direct as well as indirect implications for human medical 
treatment has grown exponentially.11 The completion of the initial mapping 
of the human genome has, for better or worse, enabled us to revisit the 
fundamental questions of who we are and how we exist.12 In concert with 
the supercomputing power now available, bioinformatics has pushed 
researchers further away from the traditional scientific method.13 Modern 
research has largely eschewed the targeted observation-hypothesis-proof 
 
way beyond the means of the vast majority of Africans, or risk trade sanctions by the U.S. for 
buying or developing generic drugs at lower prices). 
 9. See infra Parts IV.,V. 
 10. See infra Part VI. 
 11. See Phil B. Fontanarosa & Catherine D. DeAngelis, Medical Applications of 
Biotechnology, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 866, 866–67 (2005) (noting the recent advances in 
biotechnology, including new applications for fetal genetic analysis); Press Release, Nat’l Cancer 
Inst., New Method of Gene Therapy Alters Immune Cells for Treatment of Advanced Melanoma; 
Technique May Also Apply to Other Common Cancers (Aug. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.cancer.gov/newscenter/pressreleases/MelanomaGeneTherapy (using genetically 
engineered white blood cells to successfully treat melanoma patients); see generally 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INST., Historical Events in Biotechnology History, available at  
http://www.biotechinstitute.org/what_is/timeline html (providing a timeline of the major events in 
biotechnology).   
 12. See, e.g., David A. Hinds et al., Whole-Genome Patterns of Common DNA Variation in 
Three Human Populations, 307 SCI. 1072, 1079 (2005) (examining genetic variation among 
unrelated individuals of European, African, and Asian descent to “enable a wide variety of 
additional analyses to be carried out by scientists investigating the structure of human genetic 
variation as well as the genetic basis of human phenotypic differences”). 
 13. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Controversial From the Start, 291 SCI. 1182, 1182–88 (2001) 
(comparing National Institutes of Health’s deliberate, methodical approach to mapping the human 
genome with Venter’s technique, which used an automated sequencing machine to sequence the 
genome). 
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paradigm in favor of high throughput methods that involve whole sample 
disintegration and massive data analysis.14 In this latter approach, what is 
often stripped away is information about relevance. Moreover, research 
tools have become less the mere aids to the discovery process and more the 
actual discovery platform.15 
Given the rapidity with which medical technology has evolved,16 the 
laws that regulate its use have had great difficulty keeping pace. Curiously, 
the governance of medical technology creation, namely through the patent 
law, has been remarkably static.17 The statutory framework enacted in 
1952, well before the first computer and gene-based inventions, still applies 
much in its original form.18 
Section 101 of Title 35 of the U.S. Code provides that “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”19 In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted this statute to endorse 
patentable subject matter “to include anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”20 The Court held that Chakrabarty’s patent claims to a genetically 
 
 14. See Charles Vorndran & Robert L. Florence, Bioinformatics: Patenting the Bridge 
Between Information Technology and the Life Sciences, 42 IDEA 93, 105 (2002) (noting the need 
to use bioinformatics to “sift through and make sense of” the vast amounts of data acquired in the 
fields of genomics and proteomics); David S. Roos, Computational Biology: Bioinformatics—
Trying to Swim in a Sea of Data, 291 SCI. 1260 (2001) (discussing the importance of database 
development and pattern recognition algorithms in computational biology). 
 15. See Press Release, Compugen, Ltd., Compugen Discovers Drug Target for Treatment of 
Multiple Myeloma (May 11, 2010), available at http://www.cgen.com/ Content.aspx? 
Page=press_releases&NewsId=496 (discussing Compugen’s validation of a drug that treats 
multiple myeloma and noting that “[u]nlike traditional high throughput trial and error . . . 
Compugen’s discovery efforts are based on in silico (by computer) prediction and selection 
utilizing a growing number of field focused proprietary discovery platforms accurately modeling 
biological processes at the molecular level”). 
 16. See generally BIOTECHNOLOGY INST., supra note 11 (providing a timeline of the major 
events in biotechnology).   
 17. See Leah Nylen & Seth Stern, S515—Patent Reform Act of 2009, CQ BILL ANALYSIS, 
May 22, 2009 (“The last revision of patent law occurred in 1952 . . .”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). U.S. patent rights are governed generally by Title 35 of the U.S. 
Code and Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The U.S. Constitution expressly sets forth 
the legislative authority for U.S. patent protection. See  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress 
shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . 
. .”). 
 20. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 
5 (1952)). 
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engineered bacterium capable of breaking down multiple components of 
crude oil invention were eligible for patent protection.21 The Court based its 
conclusion, at least in part, on the fact that Chakrabarty’s invention had 
significant value for the treatment of oil spills and possessed properties that 
no naturally occurring bacteria exhibited.22 
Furthermore, the Court embraced the sentiment that the scope of 
patent eligible subject matter be construed broadly.23 But the Court also 
clearly acknowledged limitations to patent eligible subject matter, stating: 
 
The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have 
been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the 
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject 
matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law 
that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. 
Such discoveries are “manifestations of. . . nature, free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none.24 
 
However, the broad “anything under the sun that is made by man” 
prescription quickly became the enduring legacy of Chakrabarty, which 
opened the field of biotechnology patents.25 
For the next quarter of a century, the patenting of medical technology, 
including gene-based inventions, continued relatively unfettered despite 
vocal opposition over the potential ills of ownership of genomic 
information per se and genomic information as research tools for future 
discovery.26 The discourse and patent law jurisprudence during this period 
 
 21. Id. at 310 (“His discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is 
patentable subject matter under § 101.”). 
 22. Id. (“[T]he patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.”). 
 23. Id. at 308 (noting that the Patent Act “embodied Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity 
should receive a liberal encouragement’” (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans 
(May 2, 1807), in 5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75, 75–76 (Washington ed. 1871))). 
 24. Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant 
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)) (internal citations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 309–10 (holding man-made discovery patentable). See infra Part III. 
 26. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 700 (noting the potential of “holdout problems” 
that would stifle research); Douglas Robinson & Nina Medlock, Diamond v. Chakrabarty: A 
Retrospective on 25 Years of Biotech Patents, 17 INTELL. PROP & TECH. J. 12, 13 (2005) (noting 
that the number of biotechnology patents granted has increased from 2,160 in 1989 to 7,763 in 
2002). 
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focused on the application of virtually every patent standard other than 
patentable subject matter.27 
III 
In early 1997, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) uncovered a 
hornet’s nest when it announced the likelihood that patent claims would be 
granted to genomic fragments called expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).28 In the heady times of The 
Human Genome Project, thousands of these ESTs and SNPs were being 
obtained with only a nominal understanding of their biological 
significance.29 
Undaunted, companies filed hundreds of patent applications, seeking 
intellectual property rights to these genomic fragments with bare indications 
of what they were and even fainter disclosures of what they did.30 
Moreover, these patent claims were of broad enough scope to capture as an 
infringer any user of a product derived from genomic material that included 
a patented sequence.31 Such fears rekindled the public outcry over gene 
 
 27. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reviewing a patent 
application for satisfaction of the utility requirement); Joshua McGuire, Nonobviousness: 
Limitations on Evidentiary Support, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 189 (2003) (arguing that the 
standard of obviousness should be based on “the general knowledge possessed by a person of 
ordinary skill in the relevant art”); C. Douglas Thomas, Secret Prior Art—Get Your Priorities 
Straight!, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 147, 166–69 (1996) (stating that public policy concerns favor the 
adoption of a whole-contents novelty-only approach to the U.S. patent system). See infra Part III. 
 28. See Ed Susman, U.S. PTO to Allow Patents on Gene Fragments Called ESTs, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Mar. 3, 1997, at 1 (“A Clinton Administration official dropped a 
Valentine’s Day bombshell on genetic scientists, announcing that the government Patent and 
Trademark Office has begun allowing patents on controversial expressed sequence tags (ESTs).”). 
 29. Andrew Pollack, Is Everything for Sale? Patenting a Human Gene As if It Were an 
Invention, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at C1 (stating that “companies have filed for patents in 
large numbers without knowing the functions of many genes” and referencing a Human Genome 
Science patent for a gene as an immune system reporter only to find out later by other researchers 
that the gene was useful in AIDS treatment).   
 30. See David S. Corwin & Paul A. Lesko, Make, Use, Cell: Debunking the Uncertainty 
Surrounding Genomic-Related Patents, INTELL. PROP. WORLDWIDE, Sept. 1, 2000 (discussing the 
perceived limited utility of ESTs and fragments of genes);Tom Reynolds, Pricing Human Genes: 
The Patent Rush Pushes On, 92 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 96–97 (2000); Pollack, supra note 
29;Vorndran & Florence, supra note 14, at 105 (discussing the literature criticizing genomic 
fragment patents for lacking utility). 
 31. See generally Timothy Caulfied et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human 
Gene Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091, 1091–92 (2006) (discussing the 
problems with designing around the broad patents); Simon Mazzola, Compulsory Licensing of 
Genome Biotech Patents, 4 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 2 (1999) (discussing EST patents and 
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patenting generally and its potential chilling effect on biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical research and development.32 But the Patent Gold Rush was 
on. 
Still, like most gold rushes, the dreams of riches from the ownership of 
genomic data alone began to fade almost as quickly as they arose.33 The 
USPTO established instanta de facto moratorium on the examination of 
EST and SNP claims.34 To qualify for patent protection, an invention must 
be useful, new and nonobvious to one skilled in the pertinent technical 
field.35 Also, the invention must be described in a manner compliant with 
the standards of written description, enablement, best mode, and 
definiteness.36 These requirements help ensure that the public receives a 
valuable benefit from the disclosure of an innovative technology in return 
for a grant of temporary exclusivity to the patentee.37 
In particular, a patent applicant must be able to teach the public about 
the invention by providing a reasonably clear answer to two fundamental 
questions: “What is it?” and “What does it do?”38 With regard to ESTs and 
SNPs, the response to “What is it?” was problematic enough, and the 
 
patent infringement lawsuits); Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at 
A23 (discussing the gene patent holder’s practice of blocking competitors). 
 32. See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 698–99 (discussing the tragedy of the 
anticommons related to biomedical patents); David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 
29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 152 (2001) (discussing criticism of DNA patenting); Crichton, supra 
note 31 (describing how gene patents “can be used to block innovation, and hurt patient care”); 
Carl T. Hall, Biotech Industry Battles Move to Ban Patents, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1995, at D1 
(discussing a religious movement’s public outcry against genetic patents). 
 33. See John T. Bentivoglio & Martha L. Cochran, Policy Issues Could Have Major Impact 
on Industry, NAT’L L.J., June 25, 2001, at C9 (explaining how intellectual property laws may 
dramatically impact the value of biotechnology companies). See also infra notes 34–37 and 
accompanying text. 
 34. See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“If a patent 
application discloses only nucleic acid molecular structure for a newly discovered gene, and no 
utility for the claimed isolated gene, the claimed invention is not patentable.”). See generally 
Timothy A. Worrall, The 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and DNA Patents, 16 
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 123 (2001) (discussing the impact of the new USPTO examination 
guidelines on gene patent applications); But see Corwin & Lesko, supra note 30 (discussing the 
public’s misinterpretation that there was a moratorium). 
 35. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 103 (2006). 
 36. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 37. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated 
by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the 
public from an invention with substantial utility.”). 
 38. See 35 U.S.C. § 102–04 (2006) (setting forth the requirements of the patent specification). 
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response to “What does it do?” was simply unknown.39 The USPTO 
struggled with attempts to reconcile the applicability of traditional, generic 
principles of patent law to this emerging technology.40 The USPTO initially 
issued the 1999 Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, only to 
withdraw them in the face of critical public comment.41 The reissuing of the 
USPTO prescriptions in this regard ultimately came in the form of the 2001 
Utility Examination Guidelines.42 The operative framework for meeting the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 now includes the mandate for a patent 
applicant to articulate a specific, substantial and credible utility.43 
One inherent problem with making sense of the patent law is the 
temporal distortion that occurs between the time patent claims are filed and 
the time the USPTO and/or federal courts pass on the patentability or 
invalidity of those claims. In some cases, a decade or more can separate 
these two events.44 
Of course, much, if not everything, can change in that time. What 
seemed impossible back then can be child’s play today. When ESTs and 
SNPs were discovered, their elucidation through the automated isolation 
and purification of vast numbers of genomic fragments to facilitate 
chemical formula descriptions (high throughput polynucleotide sequencing) 
occurred without learning anything about their origin, fit, or function.45 
Such an abstract process of invention hardly came with a complete answer 
to what the invention was, much less yielded any insight as to what the 
invention did.46 
 
 39. See Vorndran & Florence, supra note 14, at 105 (stating that the sequences themselves do 
not reveal what the genes do). 
 40. The USPTO issued several sets of revised examination guidelines in a short period. See 
infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶1, 
“Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001) (stating “[t]hese Guidelines 
supersede the ‘Revised Interim Guidelines [from December 1999]’” and responding to comments 
received in response to the December 1999 interim guidelines). 
 42. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
 43. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
2100-20 (8th  ed., rev. July 8, 2010). 
 44. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (assessing 
the state of biotechnology art twenty years earlier); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 
1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (assessing the state of biotechnology art sixteen years earlier); Kridl 
v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 1446, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (assessing the state of biotechnology art 
thirteen years earlier). 
 45. See generally Robin Marantz Henig, The Rush to Claim a Little Slice of Life, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at B05 (describing patent applications as place holders until companies 
determine the value of the genetic material). 
 46. See Vorndran & Florence, supra note 14, at 105. 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction of patent appeals from trial forums nationwide,47 addressed the 
patentability of these genomic inventions in In re Fisher48 under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, but not for the lack of patent eligible subject matter, and instead for 
the lack of utility.49 The Federal Circuit held that a claimed invention must 
have a specific and substantial utility to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, that an 
application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed 
in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after 
further research, and that an asserted use must show that that claimed 
invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public.50 
The Federal Circuit specified that an asserted use must also show that a 
claimed invention can be used to provide a well-defined and particular 
benefit to the public.51 
The Federal Circuit noted that as of the filing date of its patent 
application, Fisher admitted that the underlying genes had no known 
functions and that the claimed ESTs acted as no more than research 
intermediates that may help scientists to isolate the particular underlying 
 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006). 
 48. 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reviewing Ex parte Fisher, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1020 (B.P.A.I. 
2004) (concerning U.S. patent application Serial No. 09/619, 643)). 
 49. Id. at 1369. The Fisher case arrived for the Federal Circuit’s review from a decision by 
the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that affirmed in-part and reversed in-part 
the patent examiner’s rejection of the patent claims in a Monsanto Co. patent application to ESTs 
derived from a maize leaf tissue cDNA library. Fisher, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020–30. The Board 
agreed with the patent examiner that the claimed invention failed to satisfy the utility and 
enablement requirements, but disagreed with the written description rejection. Id. Monsanto had 
asserted that the claimed ESTs were useful for producing a plant containing reduced levels of a 
protein; determining an association between a polymorphism and a plant trait; isolating a genetic 
region or nucleic acid; determining a level or pattern in a plant cell of a protein in a plant; 
determining a mutation in a plant whose presence is predictive of a mutation affecting a level or 
pattern of a protein; acting as molecular tags to isolate genetic regions, isolate genes, map genes 
and determine gene function; and identifying tissues. Id. However, the Board reasoned that 
virtually any nucleic acid could manifest these generic uses. Id. Among other things, Monsanto 
argued to the board that ESTs have real-world value as seen from the growth of a multimillion-
dollar industry in the United States premised on the usefulness of ESTs. Id. The Board noted that 
the claims were drawn to ESTs alone, rather than EST databases, clone sets or micro arrays, or 
other practical applications of ESTs. Id. In any event, the patent examiner and the Board found 
that absent a teaching about particular plant proteins or traits, these asserted uses were not specific 
or substantial enough to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. Based on the same 
scarcity of information of a specific or substantial utility, the patent examiner and the Board 
concluded that the patent applicant did not satisfy the enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
which demands an adequate instruction to one skilled in the art about how to make and use the 
claimed invention without undue experimentation. Id. 
 50. Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371. 
 51. Id. 
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protein-encoding genes and conduct further experimentation on those 
genes.52 Fisher compared “the claimed ESTs to certain other patentable 
research tools, such as a microscope.”53 The Federal Circuit explained that 
while a microscope can offer an immediate, real world benefit in a variety 
of applications, the same could not be said for the claimed ESTs.54 The 
Federal Circuit found that the claimed ESTs were “unable to provide any 
information about the overall structure let alone the function of the 
underlying gene.”55 The Federal Circuit thus held that Fisher’s asserted 
uses, therefore, did not meet the standard for a “substantial” utility under 35 
U.S.C. § 101.56 
According to the Federal Circuit, “Fisher’s asserted uses represent[ed] 
merely hypothetical possibilities, objectives which the claimed ESTs, or 
any EST for that matter, could possibly achieve, but none for which they 
have been used in the real world.”57 The Federal Circuit further explained 
that Fisher’s asserted uses were not sufficiently “specific” — that is, 
nothing about Fisher’s “alleged uses set the five claimed ESTs apart from 
the more than 32,000 ESTs disclosed in the . . . [patent] application or 
indeed from any EST derived from any organism.”58 
In addressing the patentability of the EST claims in Fisher, the Federal 
Circuit reinforced the quid pro quo of a suitable primer on the claimed 
invention in exchange for the patent grant.59 In the words of the U.S. 
Supreme Court about the utility requirement, “. . . a patent is not a hunting 
license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful 
conclusion.”60 
After the Fisher decision, the concerns over the implications for gene 
patents largely returned to a focus on patents claiming DNA sequences that 
 
 52. Id. at 1373. 
 53. Id. The Federal Circuit explained, however, that although both a microscope and one of 
the claimed ESTs can be used to generate scientific data about a sample having unknown 
properties, Fisher’s analogy was flawed because a microscope has the specific benefit of optically 
magnifying an object to immediately reveal its structure. Id. One of the claimed ESTs, by contrast, 
could only be used to detect the presence of genetic material having the same structure as the EST 
itself. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1374. 
 57. Id. at 1373. 
 58. Id. at 1374. 
 59. Id. at 1371. 
 60. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966). 
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encode a complete protein or a portion thereof.61 The standards for 
patenting inventions generally became stricter in light of the evolving 
jurisprudence in the doctrines of inherent anticipation and obviousness. 
To receive patent protection, the invention must be novel, i.e., not 
anticipated by the prior art.62 An invention is anticipated if a single prior art 
reference expressly or inherently discloses each and every limitation of the 
claimed invention.63 Thus, a prior art reference without express reference to 
a claim limitation may nonetheless anticipate by inherency.64 Inherency is 
not necessarily coterminous with knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the 
art. Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics 
or functioning of the prior art.65 The new realization alone does not render 
that necessary prior art patentable.66 This evolution of the doctrine of 
inherent anticipation arguably has made it more difficult for applicants to 
obtain gene patents, particularly those claiming only certain fragments of a 
gene, which is otherwise disclosed in the prior art.67 
 
 61. See Christopher M. Holman, Learning from Litigation: What Can Lawsuits Teach Us 
about the Role of Human Gene Patents in Research and Innovation?, 18 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 
215, 222–23 (2009) (“As a class, litigations involving therapeutic proteins are pursued much more 
vigorously than other human gene patent litigations.”). 
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 63. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (overruled on other grounds) (“Invalidity for anticipation requires that all of the elements 
and limitations of the claim are found within a single prior art reference.”). 
 64. See In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding 
inherent anticipation for a patent claim about a method for making pharmaceutical formulation); 
Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (holding 
that a patent application on degradation-preventing of water or other “Lewis acid inhibitors” with 
sevoflurane was anticipated by inherency by a prior art patent that disclosed sevoflurane saturated 
with water); In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 1256–59 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding asserted claims 
covering a gene’s nucleotide sequence anticipated where the gene, though not its particular 
sequence, was already known to the art); In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1349–50 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (ruling that an inventor’s recognition of substances that render broccoli and 
cauliflower particularly healthy does not permit patent on identifying broccoli seeds or preparing 
broccoli as a food product); Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 781–82 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (holding asserted claims on alloy anticipated by inherency). 
 65. See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
the contention that inherent anticipation requires recognition in the prior art). 
 66. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (explaining that newly discovered results of known processes are not patentable because 
those results are inherent in the known processes); Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil & Co. of 
Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 633 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that the recognition of a new aspect of a known 
process is not a patentable invention of a novel process). 
 67. See James DeGiulio, Comment, The Genomic Research and Accessibility Act: More 
Science Fiction than Fact, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 292, 295 (2010) (asserting that the 
doctrine of inherent anticipation has made obtaining gene patents more difficult).  
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To receive patent protection, an invention must also be nonobvious at 
the time of the invention to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art.68 In 
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,69 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a 
rigid application of the Federal Circuit’s approach known as the [t]eaching, 
suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test, under which a patent claim is only 
proved obvious if some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art 
teachings can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the 
knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.70 
The Court opined that “inventions in most, if not all, instances rely 
upon building blocks long since uncovered and claimed discoveries almost 
of necessity will be combinations of what, in some sense, is already 
known.”71 According to the Court, the obviousness analysis “cannot be 
confined by an overemphasis on the importance of published articles and 
the explicit content of issued patents.”72 The Court noted that “granting 
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course 
without real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents 
combining previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their 
value or utility.”73 The Court admonished that “when there is a design need 
or market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of 
identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason 
to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp.”74 The Court 
noted, “[i]f this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely the product not 
of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense.”75 This relaxation of 
the obviousness standard arguably also has made it more difficult for 
applicants to obtain gene patents, particularly those claiming a novel 
combination or other use of known genes and/or gene fragments.76 
 
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 69. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 70. Id. at 407, 415. 
 71. Id. at 418–19. 
 72. Id. at 419. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 421. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See, e.g., Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 179, 229 –30 (2007) (discussing the impact of the Supreme Court’s relaxing of the 
obviousness standard); see also DeGiulio, supra note 67, at 295 (asserting that relaxation of the 
obviousness standard could possibly make obtaining gene patents more difficult). 
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IV 
In 2008, the spotlight on patent law issues relating to medical technology 
turned to patent eligible subject matter along with the general attention to In 
re Bilski.77 In that case, the Federal Circuit held that a process must be tied 
to a particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a 
different state or thing (“machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for 
patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101.78 While much public attention had 
focused on the implications for financial services and computer software 
companies (the factual context from which the Bilski case arose),79 there 
were broad implications for the patenting of all technologies, including 
medical technology. 
On December 19, 2008, the Federal Circuit issued a nonprecedential 
decision in Classen Immunotherapies Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,80 and on 
September 16, 2009, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential decision in 
Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Services.81 The Classen and 
Prometheus cases were the first appeals at the Federal Circuit that applied 
the Bilski machine-or-transformation test to a medical technology 
invention.82 
In Classen, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment 
that U.S. Patent No. 5,723,283, which related to immunization methods, 
and associated compositions, for substantially preventing or reducing the 
symptoms of an infectious disease and chronic immune mediated disorder, 
was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for lack of patentable subject matter.83 
 
 77. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964,130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010). 
 78. Id. at 954. 
 79. See generally Kelsey I. Nix, Federal Circuit Raises the Bar for Business Method Patents, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2009, at 27 (discussing the implications of Bilski on business 
method patents); Carol J. Williams, Supreme Court; A Fresh Patent Manual Sought; Inventors 
Insist Their Innovations Deserve Protection, Even if They’re not Mechanical, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
24, 2009, at C1 (discussing implications on the business community from Bilski); Brad Stone, A 
Patent Ruling May Be Revisited, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at C5 (discussing implications for 
business method patents from future outcome of Bilski). 
 80. 304 Fed. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
 81. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010). 
 82. Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P. Murphy, Bilski’s “Machine-or-Transformation” Test: 
Uncertain Prognosis for Diagnostic Methods and Personalized Medicine Patents, 20 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 755, 769–73 (2010) (discussing Federal Circuit’s decisions in 
Classen and Prometheus). 
 83. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x at 866. 
      
 
 
A C F M T I 
 
48   JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW 
 
The Federal Circuit applied its machine-or-transformation test to reach this 
conclusion.84 
In Prometheus, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded the district 
court’s summary judgment that U.S. Patents No. 6,355,623 and No. 
6,680,302, which related to methods for calibrating the proper dosage of 
thiopurine drugs used for treating both gastrointestinal and non-
gastrointestinal autoimmune diseases, were invalid for patent ineligibility 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.85 The Federal Circuit determined that the methods 
of treatment claimed in the patents in suit squarely fell within the realm of 
patentable subject matter because they transformed an article into a 
different state or thing, and this transformation was central to the purpose of 
the claimed process.86 The Federal Circuit concluded that the 
transformation is of the human body following the administration of a drug 
and the various chemical and physical changes of the drug’s metabolites 
that enable their concentrations to be determined.87 The Federal Circuit did 
not view the disputed claims as merely claiming natural correlations and 
data-gathering steps.88 The asserted claims, in the Federal Circuit’s view, 
were in effect claims to methods of treatment, which are always 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1339 (internal citations omitted) (“The patents 
claim[ed]claimed methods for calibrating the proper dosage of thiopurine drugs, which are used 
for treating both gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal autoimmune diseases. These drugs 
include 6-mercaptopurine (‘6-MP’) and azathiopurine (‘AZA’), a pro-drug that upon 
administration to a patient converts to 6-MP, which are used to treat inflammatory bowel diseases 
(‘IBD’) such as Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. 6-MP is broken down by the body into 
various 6-MP metabolites, including 6-methyl-mercaptopurine (‘6-MMP’) and 6-thioguanine (‘6-
TG’) and their nucleotides. The patents involv[ed] measurements of these two metabolites. Drugs 
that deliver 6-TG are widely used for their cytotoxic and immunosuppressive properties. Although 
drugs such as 6-MP and AZA have been used for years to treat autoimmune diseases, non-
responsiveness and drug toxicity may complicate treatment in some patients. To that end, the 
patents claim[ed] methods that seek to optimize therapeutic efficacy while minimizing toxic side 
effects. As written, the methods typically include two separately lettered steps: (a) ‘administering’ 
a drug that provides 6-TG to a subject and (b) ‘determining’ the levels of the drug’s metabolites, 
6-TG and/or 6-MMP, in the subject. The measured metabolite levels are then compared to pre-
determined metabolite levels, ‘wherein’ the measured metabolite levels ‘indicate a need’ to 
increase or decrease the level of drug to be administered so as to minimize toxicity and maximize 
efficacy of  treatment. In particular, according to the patents, a 6-TG level greater than about 400 
picomole (‘pmol’) per 800 million red blood cells or a 6-MMP level greater than about 7000 pmol 
per 800 million red blood cells indicates that a downward adjustment in drug dosage may be 
required in order to avoid toxic side effects. Conversely, according to the patents, a 6-TG level of 
less than about 230 pmol per 800 million red blood cells indicates a need to increase the dosage to 
ensure therapeutic efficacy.”).  
 86. Id. at 1347. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1349. 
      
L M. S 
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011                                                                                      49 
 
transformative when a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to 
ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.89 
In particular, the Federal Circuit found that when administering a drug 
such as AZA or 6-MP, the human body necessarily underwent a 
transformation.90 The Federal Circuit emphasized that drugs do not pass 
through the body untouched without affecting it.91 According to the Federal 
Circuit, “[t]he fact that the change of the administered drug into its 
metabolites relies on natural processes does not disqualify the administering 
step from the realm of patentability.”92 
The Federal Circuit opined that “transformations operate by natural 
principles,” but the transformation in this case was “the result of the 
physical administration of a drug to a subject to transform—i.e., treat—the 
subject, which is itself not a natural process.”93 The Federal Circuit thus 
concluded that “the administering step was not merely data-gathering but a 
significant transformative element of Prometheus’s claimed methods of 
treatment that was sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly 
within rather definite bounds.”94 
The Federal Circuit admonished that “a further requirement for patent-
eligibility was ensuring that the involvement of the transformation in 
Prometheus’s claimed process was not merely insignificant extra-solution 
activity.”95 The Federal Circuit further indicated that “[a] subsequent 
mental step d[id] not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior 
 
 89. Id. at 1348. 
 90. Id. at 1346. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. Indeed, the Federal Circuit noted that “[it] is virtually self-evident that a process for a 
chemical or physical transformation of physical objects or substances is patent-eligible subject 
matter.” Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 
S. Ct. 3218. ( 2010)). 
 94. Id. at 1346–47. The Federal Circuit recognized that while Mayo was “correct that not all 
of the asserted claims contain the administering step . . .,the determining step, which [was] present 
in each of the asserted claims, [was] also transformative and central to the claimed methods. Id. 
Determining the levels of 6-TG or 6-MMP in a subject necessarily involve[d] a transformation, for 
those levels cannot be determined by mere inspection,” the Federal Circuit found. Id. at 1347. 
 95. Id. at 1347. The Federal Circuit determined that “[w]hile it [was] true that the 
administering and determining steps gather useful data, it [was] also clear that the presence of 
those two steps in the claimed processes [was] not ‘merely’ for the purpose of gathering data. 
Instead, the administering and determining steps [were] part of a treatment protocol, and they 
[were] transformative . . .” Id. “[T]he administering step provide[d] thiopurine drugs for the 
purpose of treating disease, and the determining step measure[d] the drugs’ metabolite levels for 
the purpose of assessing the drugs’ dosage during the course of treatment,” Id.  
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steps.”96 Thus, according to the Federal Circuit, the claims “cover[ed] a 
particular application of natural processes to treat various diseases, but 
transformative steps utilizing natural processes [were] not unpatentable 
subject matter.”97 
While the Prometheus case supported the patent eligibility of medical 
treatment methods that incorporate a transformative step, the viability of 
medical diagnosis methods remained questionable pending Supreme Court 
review of the Federal Circuit’s Bilski decision.98 
On June 28, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Bilski 
v. Kappos,99 regarding the propriety of the Federal Circuit’s new exclusive 
machine-or-transformation test for patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 
101.100 The Court affirmed the Federal Circuit judgment that Bilski’s 
business method was unpatentable as an abstract idea,101 but held: 
“[T]he machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, 
an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed inventions are 
processes under §101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole 
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”102 
The Court eschewed a categorical rejection of business methods as 
patentable subject matter, but admonished that inventions that might have 
involved a useful, concrete, and tangible result under State Street Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.103 may not be patent eligible 
 
 96. Id. at 1348. “[W]hen viewed in the proper context, the final step of providing a warning 
based on the results of the prior steps [did] not detract from the patentability of Prometheus’s 
claimed methods as a whole.” Id. “The data that the administering and determining steps provided 
for use in the mental steps was obtained by steps well within the realm of patentable subject 
matter” in the Federal Circuit’s view. Id. “The addition of the mental steps to the claimed methods 
thus [did] not remove the prior two steps from that realm.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 1349 (citations omitted) (“Moreover, the claims [did] not preempt natural processes; 
they utilize[d] them in a series of specific steps . . . . Regardless, because the claims [met] the 
machine-or-transformation test, they [did] not preempt a fundamental principle . . . . The inventive 
nature of the claimed methods stem[med] not from preemption of all use of these natural 
processes, but from the application of a natural phenomenon in a series of transformative steps 
comprising particular methods of treatment.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Peter A. Jackman & Michelle K. Holoubek, Fine-Tuning the Test for Patent-
Eligibility, 43 MD. B.J. 30, 33 (2010) (discussing the potential impact on medical diagnostic 
techniques in anticipation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski). 
 99. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 100. Id. (en banc) (reviewing 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 101. Id. at 3231. 
 102. Id. at 3227. 
 103. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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now.104 The Court otherwise left to the Federal Circuit any refinements to 
the test for patent eligibility.105 In so doing, the Court allayed many fears 
that extant and future patent rights would be greatly undermined or 
extinguished.106 
In view of the Bilski decision, the Court on June 29, 2010, remanded to 
the Federal Circuit the appeals in Classen107 and Prometheus108 for further 
consideration consistent with the Court’s holdings in Bilski.109 The Federal 
Circuit’s September 1, 2010 supplemental briefing order in Prometheus 
 
 104. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. (citations omitted) (“[N]othing in today’s opinion should be 
read as endorsing interpretations of §101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has 
used in the past.”). 
 105. Id. at 3227–29 (citations omitted) (“Section 101 is a ‘dynamic provision designed to 
encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’ A categorical rule denying patent protection for 
‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate the purposes of the patent 
law’ . . . . [T]here are reasons to doubt whether the test should be the sole criterion for determining 
the patentability of inventions in the Information Age. . . . [T]he machine-or-transformation test 
would create uncertainty as to the patentability of software, advanced diagnostic medicine 
techniques, and inventions based on linear programming, data compression, and the manipulation 
of digital signals. . . . In the course of applying the machine-or-transformation test to emerging 
technologies, courts may pose questions of such intricacy and refinement that they risk obscuring 
the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public 
domain. . . . [I]n deciding whether previously unforeseen inventions qualify as patentable 
‘process[es],’ it may not make sense to require courts to confine themselves to asking the 
questions posed by the machine-or-transformation test. Section 101’s terms suggest that new 
technologies may call for new inquiries. . . . It is important to emphasize that the Court today is 
not commenting on the patentability of any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the 
above-mentioned technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive patent 
protection. This Age puts the possibility of innovation in the hands of more people and raises new 
difficulties for the patent law. With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent 
protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance 
between protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would 
discover by independent, creative application of general principles. Nothing in this opinion should 
be read to take a position on where that balance ought to be struck.”).  
 106. See Joe Mullin, After ‘Bilski,’ All Eyes on Life Sciences Patent Cases, RECORDER, Sept. 
27, 2010, at 3 (asserting Supreme Court’s ruling in Bilski did not drastically change intellectually 
property law); Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Post-Bilski, Some Things Still Don’t Merit a 
Patent, CORP. COUNS., Oct. 1, 2010, at 115 (stating that Bilski did little not drastically alter the 
state of intellectual property law). 
 107. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010). 
 108. Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 109. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., No. 09-490, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5537, at *1 (U.S. 
June 29, 2010). 
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suggests that the Federal Circuit will remain consistent with its pre-Bilski 
disposition of the appeal.110 
The Court’s holding in Bilski notwithstanding, the continued viability 
of medical diagnosis method claims, which could be viewed as mere 
correlations of data relating to natural phenomena that would not satisfy the 
machine-or-transformation test,111 is questionable. In addition, the patent 
claims to medical diagnosis methods submitted pre-Bilski may require 
amendments to achieve patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as presently 
interpreted by the USPTO following Federal Circuit precedent.112 
 
V 
 
On March 29, 2010, in Association of Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent 
& Trademark Office,113 Judge Robert Sweet of the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment invalidating 
seven U.S. patents, which related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
associated with breast cancer that are owned or licensed to Myriad 
Genetics.114 The decision was a shock to the medical technology 
industry.115 If Bilski had dealt medical technology patent rights a glancing 
blow, Myriad was a head-on tackle. 
 
 110. Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 08-1403, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
19159 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 1, 2010) (nonprecedential order) (available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov 
/images/stories/opinions-orders/2008-1403_new.pdf). 
 111. See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm’r For Patent Examination 
Policy to the Patent Examining Corps of the USPTO (June 28, 2010) [hereinafter USPTO 
Memorandum] (providing guidance on machine-or-transformation test’s role post-Bilski); Murphy 
& Murphy, supra note 82, at 767–69 (2010) (arguing that machine-or-transformation analysis 
confuses the issue of whether a medical diagnosis process is patent eligible).  
 112. USPTO Memorandum, supra note 111. See Gregory J. Carlin, Prometheus Gets De-
Livered Again: Vacated and Remanded by the Supreme Court in the Wake of Bilski, MCKEON, 
MEUNIER INTELL. PROP. L.  NEWS (Jul. 7, 2010), http://www m2iplaw.com/news/supreme-cournt-
impacts-medical-diagnostics-patent-claims (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 113. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 114. Id. at 211–12 (referring to U.S. Patents No. 5,693,473; No. 5,709,999; No. 5,710,001; No. 
5,747,282; No. 5,753,441; No. 5,837,492; and No. 6,033,857). 
 115. See e.g., Andrew Pollack, After Patent on Genes Is Rejected, Taking Stock, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2010, at B1 (“The decision invalidating the gene patents stunned many lawyers who 
follow such issues.”); Pigs Fly: Federal Court Invalidates Myriad’s Patent Claims, GENOMICS L. 
REP., (Mar. 30,  2010), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/03/30/pigs-fly-
federal-court-invalidates-myriads-patent-claims/ (calling the decision a “jaw-dropping summary 
judgment ruling”); W. Edward Ramage, The Aftermath of ‘Myriad Genetics’, LAW.COM, (June 1, 
2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202458973843 (“The recent 
ruling in [Myriad] has created more than a few ripples in the biotech industry.”). 
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Judge Sweet based his conclusions that the composition of matter 
patent claims were not directed to patentable subject matter on the fact that 
the claimed “isolated DNA” was not “markedly different” from the 
corresponding DNA found in nature.116 Judge Sweet focused on the expert 
testimony that genes are multifunctional with a dual nature as a chemical 
molecule as well as an information repository.117 In his view, the nucleotide 
sequence was the defining characteristic of both native and isolated DNA, 
and therefore, he concluded that the primary biological function of isolated 
DNA was the same as that of the corresponding native DNA.118 In so 
doing, he discounted Myriad’s arguments that the differences between 
native and isolated DNA as chemical molecules should be the crux of the 
patentable subject matter inquiry.119 Moreover, Judge Sweet abruptly 
dismissed concerns over the impact of his decision on the biotechnology 
industry as unfounded.120 In addition, Judge Sweet embraced the Federal 
Circuit’s Bilski and Prometheus holdings to invalidate the method claims of 
the Myriad patents.121 
Although the public reaction to the Myriad ruling has been mixed, the 
element of surprise seemed shared among all.122 For patient advocacy 
groups and medical practitioners, the decision lends credence to the notion 
that patent exclusivity for medical prevention, diagnosis and treatment has 
been based on tenuous distinctions from the public domain and other 
“lawyer’s trick[s].”123 For industry members and their patent attorneys, the 
 
 116. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 232. 
 117. Id. at 228. 
 118. Id. at 229. 
 119. Id. at 228 (“Myriad’s focus on the chemical nature of DNA, however, fails to 
acknowledge the unique characteristics of DNA that differentiate it from other chemical 
compounds.”). 
 120. Id. at 228 n.51. 
 121. Id. at 233–37. 
 122. See supra note 115; see also Mildred Cho, Patently Unpatentable: Implications of the 
Myriad Court Decision on Genetic Diagnostics, TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, 2010, at 1–4 
(“Even to longtime observers of patent law, this decision came as a shock because it questions 
long-held practices in the writing and granting of gene patents.”). 
 123. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 185 (footnote omitted) (“The claims-
in-suit directed to ‘isolated DNA’ containing human BRCA1/2 gene sequences reflect the 
USPTO’s practice of granting patents on DNA sequences so long as those sequences are claimed 
in the form of ‘isolated DNA.’ This practice is premised on the view that DNA should be treated 
no differently from any other chemical compound, and that its purification from the body, using 
well-known techniques, renders it patentable by transforming it into something distinctly different 
in character. Many, however, including scientists in the fields of molecular biology and genomics, 
have considered this practice a ‘lawyer's trick’ that circumvents the prohibitions on the direct 
patenting of the DNA in our bodies but which, in practice, reaches the same result.”)  
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decision represents an indefensible departure from decades of precedent as 
well as a significant undermining of established investment-backed 
expectations.124 
Now on appeal before the Federal Circuit, Myriad raises the question 
whether Judge Sweet was correct in his characterization of genomic 
fragments and synthetic polynucleotides as mere physical embodiments of 
the laws of nature that should be precluded from patentable subject 
matter.125 While many commentators expect the Federal Circuit to reverse 
the trial court on either substantive or procedural grounds,126 perhaps we 
are in store for further surprises. Indeed, Judge Timothy Dyk of the Federal 
Circuit, in dissent from the majority in Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.,127 
seemed to be sympathetic to Judge Sweet’s reasoning.128 Precedent 
notwithstanding, only history will reveal whether Judge Sweet was simply 
the first to say the Emperor has no clothes.129 
 
 
 
 
 124. See, e.g., Cho, supra note 122, at 1 (stating that the Myriad decision “represents a major 
challenge to the way USPTO has granted patents on genes”); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. 
Mello, Gene Patenting–Is the Pendulum Swinging Back?, 20 NEW ENG. J. MED. 362, 1857–58 
(2010) (“Although well-grounded in legislative history and Supreme Court precedent, [Judge 
Sweet’s] decision flies in the face of years of decision making by the USPTO . . . .”); John 
Schwartz & Andrew Pollack, Cancer Genes Cannot Be Patented, U.S. Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 30, 2010, at B1 (providing input from a patent lawyer, a former biotechnology company 
head, and a venture capitalist on the Myriad decision—that it could “make it harder for young 
companies to raise money from investors,” “diminish the incentives for genetic research,” and 
“push more work aimed at discovering genes and diagnostic tests to universities,” respectively). 
 125. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology , 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227, 229, 232 (“[P]urification of a 
product of nature, without more, cannot transform it into patentable subject matter.”). 
 126. See, e.g., HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Mar. 30, 2010), 
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/in-case-challenging-myriad-gene-patents html 
(“Hopefully the Federal Circuit will intervene, and either reverse the decision, or at least limit its 
reach.”); Posting of Dennis Crouch, PATENTLYO (Mar. 30, 2010 07:17AM EST), http 
://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/court-essentially-all-gene-patents-are-invalid html (“The 
Federal Circuit is likely to reverse this decision –opening the door to an important Supreme Court 
showdown.”). 
 127. 2010 WL 3064311, *9 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at *11 (“[I]n order for a product of nature to satisfy section 101, it must be 
qualitatively different from the product occurring in nature, with ‘markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature.’ It is far from clear that an ‘isolated’ DNA sequence is 
qualitatively different from the product occurring in nature such that it would pass the test laid out 
in Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty. The mere fact that such a DNA molecule does not occur in 
isolated form in nature does not, by itself, answer the question.”). 
 129. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR’S NEW SUIT (1837). 
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VI 
 
In a particularly crowded field of technology, such as medical technology, 
the uncertainty over entitlement to patent exclusivity can disqualify 
otherwise innovative methods and their associated products from access to 
commercial investment, market entry, and/or post-market entry 
sustainability.130 The oft cited purpose of the patent laws is to promote the 
progress of the useful arts through the creation of temporary exclusivity 
rights as an incentive for the prompt, public disclosure of inventions 
because the patent exclusivity facilitates innovative efforts and encourages 
investment in such endeavors.131 These principles apply with equal, if not 
greater force in the medical technology industry sector, where commercial 
competition is intense.132 Beyond the known beneficial effects today of an 
enfranchising patent eligibility standard under 35 U.S.C. § 101,133 perhaps 
a more essential consideration is the maintenance of a patent eligibility test 
that will continue the promise of patent protection for innovations to come. 
The Bilski decision and its progeny will open the door to the use of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 as an instrument for determining precisely what innovation 
will be acceptable. In Chakrabarty,134 the U.S. Supreme Court took the 
wise approach of interpreting § 101 as broadly inclusive in favor of 
allowing the other statutory conditions for patentability to more finely 
monitor what inventions may be patented vis-à-vis the prior art.135 A 
patentable subject matter standard that embraces inclusiveness ensures 
continuing innovation in new as well as old fields of technology. Tinkering 
with patent eligibility in hopes of crafting a standard generally applicable to 
 
 130. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(noting that Myriad claimed it could not have funded its research without the patent protecting the 
investment). 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . .”). See Geoffrey Karny, In 
Defense of Gene Patenting: The Principles of Our Patent System Are Sound and Bring Immense 
Benefits, GENETIC ENGINEERING BIOTECH. NEWS (Apr. 1, 2007), http:// 
www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/in-defense-of-gene-patenting/2052/ (asserting that banning 
gene patents would risk “shutting down a large part of the industry and creating a major roadblock 
to progress in patient care and food production”). 
 132. See Graham et. al., supra note 6, at 1277, 1288, 1290 (2009) (finding that patents are 
more commonly used and considered more important in biotechnology and medical devices 
sectors as compared to the software and Internet fields). 
 133. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 134. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 135. Id. at 308–09. 
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past, present, and future technologies, however well intentioned, may bring 
unforeseeable consequences, including the unfortunate chilling of future 
innovation. 
No readily acceptable solution is available for the patentability of 
medical technology that involves gene-based inventions and their 
diagnostic applications.136 The controversy may be driven, at least in part, 
by the absence of a distinction in the patent law between invention and 
discovery.137 The interchangeability of these terms as a matter of patent law 
defies the common understanding of these two terms where invention tends 
to suggest the components of labor and ingenuity in the production of 
something new whereas discovery tends to suggest a component of fortuity 
in the revelation of something old.138 
A reinvigoration of the inventorship standards might serve to decrease 
the issuance of gene patents.139 The patent law jurisprudence uniformly 
recognizes the element of conception in defining invention.140 But the 
 
 136. See Laurie Axford, Are Diagnostic Method Claims Patentable?: New Rulings Raise Old 
Questions, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5134 (“[T]he patentability of diagnostic method claims is still 
up in the air”); Lawrence M. Sung, Patent Eligible Medical Technology Post-Bilski: Prometheus 
Labs., Inc. and Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4810 ( “[V]iability of medical 
diagnosis methods remains questionable post-Bilski”); Marisa Noel Pins, Note, Impeding Access 
to Quality Patient Care and Patient Rights: How Myriad Genetics’ Gene Patents Are 
Unknowingly Killing Cancer Patients and How to Calm the Ripple Effect, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
377, 403, 409 (2010) (pointing out conflicting and unclear provisions of the NIH Best Practices 
and USPTO’s current Utility Examination Guidelines). 
 137. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 138. See 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2006) (“The term ‘invention’ means invention or discovery.”); Cf. 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 331, 616 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “discover” 
as “to make known or visible: expose,” implying something already in existence and defining 
“invent” as “to devise by thinking . . . to produce (as something useful) for the first time . . . .”). 
 139. See Sean Tu et al., A Perfect Storm is Brewing Against Personalized Medicine, 4 
BLOOMBERG L. REPS. 8 (2010), available at 
http://www foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/6862/foley_lardner_dudas_kiko_t
u_wilson_article.pdf (Stifling of Stimulating – The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic 
Testing: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Congress (statement of Professor Lawrence Sung)). 
See infra notes 140–42. 
 140. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (2006); Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Hedrick, 573 F.3d 1290, 1297–98 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship under 35 
U.S.C. § 116. It is ‘the formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of 
the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.’ The test for 
conception is whether the inventor had an idea that was definite and permanent enough that one 
skilled in the art could understand the invention; the inventor must prove his conception by 
corroborating evidence, preferably by showing contemporaneous disclosures. Such corroborating 
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typical analysis is confined to questioning when these acts might have 
occurred for purposes of determining who is an inventor or who invented 
first.141 Little consideration is apparent on whether certain purported acts of 
invention actually meet these well accepted standards and otherwise 
constitute inventive acts.142 
Another proposal might be to recast an inventive act as a governing 
threshold for patent protection, particularly as applied to genomic 
inventions. This standard does not incorporate the traditional 
considerations, such as novelty or nonobviousness, in assessing patent 
eligibility.143 Rather, like the requirement of originality in copyright law, 
this metric considers whether the claimed invention legitimately “owes its 
origin” to the named inventor, or for that matter, to anyone.144 This 
normative proposition contemplates a minimal showing of inventive 
activity embodied in the conception of an invention in order to qualify for 
patentability. But to the extent that the conception of the invention cannot 
fairly be ascribed to an individual, i.e., the named inventor or another, the 
claimed invention would be deemed to have resulted from a non-inventive 
act, and thus, be ineligible for patent protection.145 
 
 
 
 
 
evidence is taken as a whole; conception of an entire invention need not be reflected in a single 
source. An inventor need not know that his invention will work for conception to be complete. He 
need only show that he had the complete mental picture and could describe it with particularity; 
the discovery that the invention actually works is part of its reduction to practice.”). 
 141. See, e.g., Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Affymetrix, Inc., 567 F.3d 1366, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2009); 
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293, 1299–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 142. See Martek, 579 F.3d at 1376 (analyzing corroborating evidence of reduction to practice, 
not conception); Agilent, 567 F.3d at 1375 (analyzing “whether the copying party’s specification . 
. . adequately supported the subject matter claimed by the other party . . . .”); Aventis, 499 F.3d at 
1300 (analyzing prior art status by determining whether the first inventor had “abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed” the invention”). 
 143. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 & 103 (2006) (novelty and nonobviousness requirements, 
respectively); DONALD S. CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 3.01, 5.01 (2010). 
 144. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Original in reference to a copyright work means that the particular work owes its origin to the 
author.  No large measure of novelty is required.” (quoting N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, 
Inc., 972 F.3d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 145. Cf. MEVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A] 
(“Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is 
independently created, and not copied from other works.”). 
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Conclusions 
 
The successful future of medical device innovation depends on the 
continued support that patent exclusivity facilitates through the incentive to 
invent and the incentive to invest in innovation. Although industry 
dynamics regularly adapt to incremental refinements in the law,146 a sea 
change like that seen with the recent jurisprudence on patentable subject 
matter creates immeasurable uncertainty. Without the confidence that 
investment-backed expectations can be realized, innovation will be 
retarded. However, the overall societal cost must take into account the 
immediate benefits that may accrue through open public access to novel 
medical prevention, diagnosis, and treatment.147 Unfortunately, these 
competing interests are difficult to balance because of inadequate 
information transparency and imperfect valuation metrics for the 
improvement of the human condition. 
 
 
 146. See e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1648–51 (2003) (discussing how the software and biotechnology industries have responded 
differently to changing ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ standards); Michael J. Malinowski 
& Maureen A. O’Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology 
Industry, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 163, 180–84 (1996) (tracing genotechnology’s shift from 
government sector to academia in response to federal policy); see also Robert P. Merges, One 
Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 
2226, 2228, 2230 (2000) (tracing developments of USPTO, 35 U.S.C. § 116, and Federal Circuit 
in response to changing industry, and vice versa). Carlin, supra note 112 (providing instructions 
for clients to comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Bilski). 
 147. Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is It Patent Misuse?, 6 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 120–22 (2004); Karen Mann, Gene Patents: A View From the 
Clinical Laboratory, 10 EXPERT REV. MOL. DIAGN. 123, 123–24 (2010). 
